The End of Man (Part Two), Bentham and Happiness

To have all one’s desires met, that is happiness and that is the end of man.

Epicurus, a Greek philosopher, was the first to write that happiness is the end of man, though I doubt that he was the first to think it. He said that man was no more than a collection of atoms. Different material from the world (from food, to disease, to sex, to poetry) interacts with us and produce pleasure or pain. Man has no soul; therefore he has no consideration beyond himself. His main concern in life, his end, is only that of promoting his own happiness.

This philosophy was adopted and modernized by the English reformer Jeremy Bentham. Living in a ‘scientific’ age he developed scientific criteria to judge the pureness of pleasure and pain. Bentham thought we should look to seven factors: 1) intensity, 2) duration, 3) certainty, 4) remoteness, 5) fecundity, 6) purity, and 7) extent. We simply add up the good and the bad and the column with more wins—that is the basis of determining the rightness or wrongness of all acts. If something produces more pleasure than pain it is good and moral for the end of man is nothing more than the maximization of pleasure and the reduction of pain.

Why should we do good deeds? Not because people need or deserve them or because mercy is a godly virtue, but because it makes us feel better about ourselves. We are to do good not for others, but for ourselves. Why are we loyal to friends? Because it is needed for friendship and friendship is enjoyable. Why are we faithful in marriage? Because the benefits of marriage outweigh the pain of divorce. But of course, if one can gain by disloyalty or be happier in divorce they should by all means be disloyal or get a divorce.

The first reason this theory fails is because it is logically inconsistent. Bentham says that people are not to be treated as ends in themselves, but rather only as means to another’s personal gratification and happiness. One can argue as Kant did that people are valuable as ends in themselves and therefore it is immoral to treat them as mere means. But one does not need to go that far. Making happiness the end of man is a logical inconsistency for it results in treating man as a means to this end. The inconsistency lies in the fact that man is not happiest when he is treated merely as the means to another’s end. Man is happiest when he is treated as a valuable individual who is an end in himself.

One is not happiest in a world where they are only treated as means to another’s end. Think of slaves and prostitutes, people that exist in systems that treat them entirely as means to another’s happiness. Are they happy? That is doubtful. People are happiest when they are valued and loved as individuals with worth in and of themselves. Consider the happiness of a cherished child to that of an unwanted kid. Or of a wife in a healthy marriage to an aging woman used by a number of men. People are happiest when they are treated as ends and not mere means. Therefore a philosophy that makes the happiness of man the end of man is logically inconsistent for it allows men to treat their fellow man as a means to their personal. But existing in a system like Bentham’s where people are treated as means and not ends does not produce as much happiness as a system where men are treated as valuable individuals who are absolute ends in themselves.

Second, Bentham’s criteria for judging pleasure and pain (intensity, duration, certainty, etc.) is incomplete. Bentham fails to include arguably the most important consideration: purpose. Pain is far easier to endure if it is for noble goal and is far more painful when it is completely arbitrary. Likewise, pleasure loses something when it is for an ignoble purpose. Consider what Plato argues in the Gorgias (476(a)-479(d)). He says that punishment is corrective for the soul and that it is in fact better to suffer for doing good than benefit from wrongdoing.

Third, Bentham’s argument is foolish because results are uncertain. Bentham says that consequences define the morality of an action in the sense that we judge something based off of what it produces. If it produces more happiness than pain it is good, if it produces more pain than happiness it is bad. The goodness or badness of a thing then is judged by what it produces; an action is judged by its consequences. Because consequences define morality one must act with consequences in mind. But consequences are uncertain. How do we know if we’ll be more happy divorced or less happy if we remain loyal to a friend? How do we judge if we’ll be better off obeying our government or not? How can we reason to an uncertain answer? In 1917 I am sure many Russians thought they would be happier under the Soviets than the Romanovs. By 1933 I am sure few felt this way.

How many people regret getting drunk because they got a DUI or having sex because they got an STD? Or getting a divorce or having an abortion? Even though they made these choices so as to maximize their pleasure, they ended up regretting the choices they made. Why do they lament the choices they have made? Because they didn’t realize the consequences their choices would have. The problem with any choice is that it rarely has the intended effect and often has unforeseeable consequences. That is why we cannot base our actions off of intended consequences.

Fourth, even if I am wrong and Bentham is right and men are primarily motivated by happiness, happiness is a subjective notion and it is impossible to put objective criteria on it and make it one’s life goal or purpose. No objective, external phenomenon can make a person happy or sad. Happiness is subjective to the individual; it is a choice of the will. Therefore it is foolish to make its pursuit the end of man. It is unattainable as an ultimate end. One can be happy with little while another may be miserable with much. Who is to say that simple feudal peasants were not happier than we are? Rousseau would say that science and the arts—the advancement of man—leads to a loss of freedom and man was happiest when life was simplest. Does that mean we should return to a primitive social structure? Rousseau may think so, but I reckon that many others would disagree. What makes one happy may make another unhappy so how can a state pursue it for all? It is not an absolute or objective good so it is not pursuable by reason in any way. What makes people happy? Health, power, beauty, fame, wealth: look at celebrities who have all this and more and yet are suicidal and depressed. How can one pursue happiness as an end when the objects of one’s pursuit do not make one happy? One cannot. The fact is nothing has the power to make one happy or unhappy: both are choices.

Fifth, even if the happiness is an attainable end, the pursuit of it prevents us from achieving it. “He who does not find a little enough, will find nothing enough.” Plato said that pursuing and realizing pleasure is like itching an insect bite: the more we scratch it, the more it will it will itch and the more we will need to scratch it. This is the hedonists’ paradox: pursuing happiness prevents one from attaining it. There is a right way and a wrong way to go about getting things. If one forces another to love them they will be unable to receive love, for love must be freely given. In the same way if one pursues happiness, one will be unable to be happy. Those who think that the world is made for our happiness and who pursue it at all costs often become the least happy, while those who think the world is a hard place often end up being the happiest.

Bentham fails. The happiness of man is not the end of man.